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CBA Talk

Today, 8ps9s welcomes Tim Johnson. Tim is a former food industry executive now doing a bit of freelance writing, consulting, and other work in the non-profit sector. He is a passionate, life-long NBA and Laker fan (but I guess we can overlook that). And, as will become obvious, he is also a semi-regular cash game poker player.


In poker, a more subtle version of the bluff is called the semi-bluff. It’s similar to a straight-up bluff, except you’re holding good enough cards that you could win the hand outright. What does this have to do with the NBA contract negotiations? As it turns out, a lot. They have a lot of the hallmarks of a high stakes, no limit hold ‘em hand.

Another aspect of poker is the existence two intersecting axes (that’s more than one axis, not more than one axe) that players can be grouped under. The first is passive or aggressive. This doesn’t denote what cards a player plays, but how he plays them. Both sides of the NBA negotiations, throughout the preliminary hands (pre-lockout) have demonstrated a tendency toward aggression.

The second axis is tight or loose, and indicates what type of a hand a player will play. Will they play a drawing hand, will they bluff, will they “gamble” a bit? The owners are definitely tighter than the players. They have set the narrative starting at big player concessions, and softening only slightly from there. Given the circumstances, the players have a smaller stack (money and playing career), and they’ve been getting a weaker slate of hands (the economy), so they’ve been a bit looser, offering early concessions.

The lockout was the pre-flop, in a poker sense. At this point, everyone has their hole cards, and how they bet them is the precursor to how the hand plays out. Their bets tell a story. The players felt they had a long shot at winning the hand, and the owners felt they had the possible nut hand if they could just raise the players big and long enough. The owners were looking to test the players early, with the imminent threat of an all-in bet (no season). That was their strategy. The players seem willing to split the pot and wait for another hand. But they also don’t want to just cave, so they’ve called all bets pre-flop.

What we’ve come to now is the flop. It is in many ways the most important part of the hand. It’s when the majority of the community cards come out, and where you know for certain whether you have a chance of making a hand, and an indication of how your opponent feels. It’s the time to calculate odds. The players have pretty much checked at this stage, looking for some owner willingness to get out of the hand. The owners have continued to bet, but not hugely, so they might be spooked by the players’ strong reaction to their early bets, and worried about being too aggressive and forcing the players to stay in, if only to save face.

It appears the owners have been working a semi bluff. They think with their chip stack they can risk this season to put the players at risk, but at the same time they realize there’s a downside to a loss. They like their cards, and think they can either draw (litigation) or bluff (players lose too many checks and cave) to a big win, but they are also realizing that the players may get pot committed, and if forced too strongly, have to play it all the way out. Hence the smaller bets here, trying to just get the players to fold after extracting everything they’ll put in. It’s the classic semi-bluff slowdown, since the object of a semi-bluff is to induce a fold, not necessarily duke it out.

We’re about to reach the turn, where real games get canceled. The owners already have the players at a sizable loss. The key for the owners is to know whether they’ve gotten everything, and not push beyond it. Remember, the owners’ hand is not immune from losing. It’s not the nuts, even if it’s favored. Backing off here and accepting the compromise between the positions still gives the owners the hand.

The river comes in January. That’s where someone folds or both risk the big loss. Neither side really wants to get to the river. The stakes go up. Both realize there is a number the players will fold at, and the owners are weighing whether or not they’ve already gotten to it. Both sides are also considering the next hand (a future CBA negotiation). The players will fold if they have enough chips left not to be at a crippling disadvantage in that hand. They’re on the edge of that right now. If the owners push too hard they may give up the season because there’s no real downside. They’d have to play it out and hope to draw well in court or decertification, or a combination of the two.

The owners have a solid win on the table right now. It’s time to take it.

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CBA Talk: A Little Math

by Tim Donahue on October 6, 2011 at 11:54 am · 5 comments

Make the following assumptions regarding the current collective bargaining negotiations:

  • The informal offers reportedly proposed by each side fairly represent the basketball-related income (BRI) split that each faction would accept to approve a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) right now.
  • The players are reportedly offering a deal that gives 53% to them and 47% the owners.
  • The owners have reportedly offered a 50/50 deal.
  • No costs have been excluded from BRI that weren’t excluded under the previous CBA.
  • Both sides are assuming the same types of system changes in the new CBA.
  • The 2011-12 BRI can be expected to be $4 billion.
  • The CBA would be for six years.
  • The expected BRI growth rate over the course of the next CBA is about 4% per year.

In such a situation, the players and the owners stand $120 million apart for this upcoming season, but about $790 million over the course of the six-year deal. Discounting those cash flows at 5% would yield a net present value of $664 million — which is the $790 million in “today’s dollars.”

The Math for the Players

If the players took the owners’ 50/50 offer now, they would get $2 billion this year, which equals roughly $24.4 million per game for the players collectively. In other words, if the players reject this offer, for each game lost, the players give up $24.4 million. Following this logic, it will take missing 27 games games (something that would happen by mid-December) for the players to have lost the $664 million that they are standing firm in order to receive via the BRI split.

Of course, that logic is flawed. The situation is infinitely more complex than that.

One of the big traps that we consistently fall into is viewing the sides as two monoliths. It makes the math easier. But it also muddies the waters. The “players” are 400-plus individuals at different points in their careers with different financial positions, personal concerns and general outlooks on life.

The truth is that the majority of these players will not be in the league for all six years of the next CBA. Only 48% of the players who played during the 2005-06 season played in 2010-11. In fact, 16% of the players from the 2009-2010 season were absent in 2010-11.

While fighting for future generations is great in concept, this really is asking a huge price from the majority of the league for 3 percentage points.

The Math for the Owners

The owners will experience the same “lost income” reality that the players are facing. For the sake of argument (and simplicity), let’s assume they lost $200 million for canceling the preseason, and stand to lose another $250 million or so per month for missed regular season games if they don’t accept the players’ offer now. Just like the players, if they stick to their guns (at a 50% split) they will be have forfeited $664 million by some time around Christmas to get back the $664 million they seek.

Also, like the players’ dillemma, it is infinitely more complex.

These are 30 owners who are in different financial positions. Jerry Buss and James Dolan stand to lose huge sums, while others like Herb Kohl, Michael Jordan and perhaps Herb Simon won’t be as badly hurt. Depending on the math, it’s not impossible that they would be actually losing less money by not having games.

Beyond that, the owners should recognize the 4 percentage points that are already theoretically “in their pocket.” Accepting the players position of 53% will still give them $160 million in savings this season (when compared to the 57% split of the previous CBA), and $884 million (in today’s dollars) over the course of a new, six-year CBA. Unlike the players, virtually all of these owners will be here at the end of the CBA. So the entirely of the deal is more relevant to all 30 of the current owners than it is to all of the more than 400 current players.

This consideration means that for every 1/82 of the season they cancel, they forgo another $2 million in savings on top of their other costs.

The Math for Both Sides

Everyone realizes that, once games are canceled, there will be lasting effects well beyond the simple lost profit/wages associated with these games. Should a lockout alienate fans and sponsors, then future revenues will be lost as well.

For every 1% reduction in the revenue forecast for the next six-year period, the NBA will lose about $263 million (in today’s dollars). This loss will be distributed more or less equally between the two sides and would be in addition to the lost income discussed above.

Continuing to Fight Doesn’t Add Up

Even if the owners are adamant about a 50% split, and the players have dug in at 53%, there is no math that says it is worth it to either side to lose games. I have tried to find a financial reason for either side to stand firm until the other breaks — no matter how long it takes — but I can’t. Not even if I take off my shoes.

Come Monday, if games are canceled, neither side can win. It will only be a question of which side has lost less.

But, as I’ve said before, even rational people will kill for money, but die for faith.

Right now, they say they disagree on “the economics,” but they don’t. They can’t — not if they vaguely understand “the economics.” No, what’s happening here is an Uncle Milty contest masquerading as a disagreement over BRI splits.

Well, boys, it’s come-to-Jesus time.

It’s time to put away the egos and take out the calculators. It’s time to take David Stern’s pointer finger, Dwyane Wade’s audacity, Dan Gilbert’s comic sans, Kevin Garnett’s scowl, the hard cap, the second mid-level exception, the roll backs, and stick them all in Mrs. Sarver’s purse. And then bury it all deep in an abandoned mine shaft.

It’s time for Stern to wrangle up the cats, and it’s time for player union heads Derek Fisher and Billy Hunter to bring in the rank and file. It’s time for each to end the rhetoric and the spin, and tell their constituencies straight up that not taking one more step towards each other is simply a lose/lose proposition.

It’s time for everyone to learn and understand what “Pyrrhic victory” means.

Acknowledgment: Once again, thanks to Larry Coon and his group of super geniuses over at LakersGround.net for helping to shape my thoughts here.

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The Issues That May Cost the NBA Games

by Jared Wade on October 4, 2011 at 6:22 pm · 1 comment

According to all the parties involved in the collective bargaining process, today’s meeting was critical. NBA Commissioner David Stern said that Monday’s meeting “set the table” for today’s discussions. Players’ union chief Derek Fisher called it a “very important day.” And the one entity whose opinion matters most on whether or not the season starts on time — the calendar — suggests that the two sides must agree to an agreement in principle this week in order to get the lawyers together to hammer out all the legalese before Halloween.

The two sides just finished negotiating. They were at it for hours. And they seem no closer to an agreement than they were three months ago.

At this point, it seems unlikely that the season will start on time.

Over the past few months, all the NBA community has talked about is this collective bargaining. As far as reporting goes, veteran scribes like Ken Berger, Adrian Wojnarowski, Sam Amick and Howard Beck have led the charge, bringing us fantastic updates and digging as deep into the blackbox of silence and childish rhetoric as either side would allow. These guys all deserve a standing ovation.

I’m of course biased, but when it comes to actually breaking down many of the major hurdles and concepts of the negotiations and the system by which the owners pay the players, I would argue that nobody outside of Larry Coon has covered the struggle better than our own Tim Donahue.

Of course, the reason we have dedicated so much time to this is because of how integral the future system may be to the Pacers future. It’s no secret that Indiana is one of the teams faring the worst under the previous CBA. Some of that pain was self-imposed. Some seemed more endemic of a structure that makes it much harder for the Milwaukees, Indianas and Sacramentos of the world to compete financially with the New Yorks, Los Angeleses (pick one) and Chicagos.

That’s why we’ve covered it so heavily. That and the fact that Tim understands this financial stuff better than most who have discussed it on ye olde interwebs. Hopefully, the two sides will come up with the foundation of an agreement in the coming days that will both ensure no games are missed in 2011-12 and that the Pacers are likely to still be in Indiana in 2022.

We’ll see.

But until we know more definitively, here is a recap of the major CBA pieces we have published over the past year or so. Free agency, the acquisition of George Hill and the evolution of Roy Hibbert are all vital to the future of the Pacers. But perhaps nothing is more critical than the negotiations currently going on between those who run the teams and those who play for them.

Competitive Balance and Genetically Engineered Super Gorillas
September 27, 2011

“Absolute parity is likely unattainable — and not even desirable — in any sports league. If each NFL team went 8-8, for example, the sport would become unbearably dull. But something closely approaching competitive balance, in structural terms, is attainable. And while we can debate where and how much competitive balance is necessary — or even desirable — we cannot debate whether or not it is an entirely different concept from parity.”

Why a Luxury Tax Isn’t My Idea of the Answer
September 21, 2011

“The luxury tax of the previous CBA was pretty high on the pain scale for Dallas — a good-to-very-good revenue market — but Cuban had been willing to gut it out. If, as speculated, the Dallas owner is a hawk in favor of a hard cap, it’s because he doesn’t want to lose another $150-$200 million over the next decade trying to keep up with his rivals in New York and LA that can spend even more and still make money.”

Splitting the Baby
September 19, 2011

“Really, there’s little difference between what the small and mid-market hawks want and are trying to get, and what the “middle class” of players has and is trying to keep. They want to believe they can succeed – prosper – on the court and in the ledger. They’d like to matter, and they’d like some security. That’s both the owners and the players. Meanwhile, those currently prospering – on both sides – are understandably concerned about coming out the other side of this in worse shape.”

Kill for Money, Die for Faith
September 15, 2011

“That’s why the money is easy. Everybody comes from pretty much the same place. It’s just math. More is better. Less is worse. It’s why David Stern said, ‘…we know how to negotiate over dollars when the time comes.’ The system is an entirely different beast. The system — and what it means — is an article of faith. While people will do all sorts of depraved things for money, it’s nothing compared to what they’ll do for what they fervently believe in.”

Why the Owners Might Move Enough to Get the Players to Meet Them in the Middle
September 13, 2011

“Consider this: While some owners are fine with (and some would may actually prefer) a system like the current one, there are zero players who want anything to do with the owners’ proposed changes. So while the owners have largely been portrayed (and specifically, by me) as the more unified group who have the bank accounts to hold out longer, that might be a false narrative.”

A Function of Power and Not Truth
August 29, 2011

“The problem with nuanced situations is, the more you understand them, the less firm and more oddly specific you become in your statements. And that combination of being fuzzy, yet oddly specific undermines the credibility you have with a broader audience. We live in a world that has come to equate simplicity with truth and complexity with obfuscation.”

The System, Not Stupid Contracts, Creates Wasted Payroll
July 26, 2011

“In a system that mandates the players to receive a fixed percentage of revenue while limiting how much can go to stars and young players, you get bad contracts. In fact, I would go so far to say that all you get is bad contracts.”

Comparing the Owners’ and Players’ Proposals
June 1, 2011

“From 2006 through 2010, the negotiated salaries averaged 58.5% of BRI.  Add in the benefits, and the total nominal percentage was about 62% of BRI.  The overage was returned to the owners, but in effect, this means that the first “concession” in their offer would have cost the players (and saved the owners) exactly $0 over the five-year period.”

The Upcoming CBA: One Point of View
May 13, 2011

“The hard cap is probably just about the last thing that the NBAPA would like to see, because it would have a decidedly deleterious effect on guaranteed contracts, which are not required under the CBA.  That’s right. Guarantees are only required in specific limited instances such as the rookie contracts and the first year of sign-and-trade deals. However, they are standard features on contracts in today’s market.”

Can You Sustain a High Level of Competitiveness Without Paying the Luxury Tax?
May 13, 2011

“In the five-year period I’ve studied, only two teams have made it out of the first round more than once without paying the luxury tax at any point in the five years:  Chicago (2007 & 2011) and Atlanta (2009, 2010, & 2011). ”

Simon Is Willing to Spend, But Is He Willing to Spend Enough?
May 4, 2011
“The big question of mine to him is,” said GM Larry Bird to team owner Herb Simon, “‘Now that we have the money, will we be able to spend it?’”

Pacers agree to Three Year Deal with City of Indianapolis
July 13, 2010

Pacers get $33.5 million to help operate Conseco Fieldhouse and remain in Indianapolis for at least another three years.”

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This lockout has generated a lot of serious questions about what a hard cap will or will not mean – on the court, in the standings, to a player’s career, to a team’s finances. Just for a few moments, let’s move away from the nuts-and-bolts discussion of the CBA. Let’s forget about what either side will or won’t accept.

Let’s just look at the one question that can be definitively answered: Does a hard cap provide competitive balance?

Of course, it does.

A hard cap actually guarantees competitive balance, and it’s the only tool that can guarantee it in regards to player payroll.

It guarantees competitive balance in the same way that rules dictating the number of players per team on the floor and the height of the rim do. These rules do not prevent blowouts, 72-win teams or 73-loss teams — nor are they meant to. They simply preclude one team or the other from gaining an unfair advantage using those particular tools. A hard cap is the only direct way to preclude teams from using overwhelming financial strength to gain unfair competitive advantages.

To argue against a hard cap bringing competitive balance, generally people trot out reasons and number that refute the creation and or value of parity. But those are two different things.

Competitive balance is a structural framework that creates equivalence under which all teams compete.

Parity is an outcome in which there is very little difference between the success of the best team and the worst team.

Absolute parity is likely unattainable — and not even desirable — in any sports league. If each NFL team went 8-8, for example, the sport would become unbearably dull. But something closely approaching competitive balance, in structural terms, is attainable. And while we can debate where and how much competitive balance is necessary — or even desirable — we cannot debate whether or not it is an entirely different concept from parity.

Some may consider this parsing words, but it is not. The difference is crucial — and it’s one I’ve emphasized since I entered this conversation in May. No one wants parity. Everyone needs and — to some degree — is owed competitive balance.

But to what degree?

NFL Commissioner to Rule on Super Gorilla

A few years ago, Chuck Klosterman released a collection of essays entitled Sex, Drugs, and Cocoa Puffs: A Low Culture Manifesto. One of the essays is called ”23 questions I ask everyone I meet in order to decide if I can really love them.” In effect, it’s a collection of nonsensical hypotheticals designed to show how someone’s mind works, as opposed to eliciting a specific response.

Recently, as I have continued to try to understand of the different issues in the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement, I have been contemplating question #4.

4. Genetic engineers at Johns Hopkins University announce that they have developed a so-called “super gorilla.” Though the animal cannot speak, it has a sign language lexicon of over twelve thousand words, an I.Q. of almost 85, and–most notably–a vague sense of self-awareness. Oddly, the creature (who weighs seven hundred pounds) becomes fascinated by football. The gorilla aspires to play the game at its highest level and quickly develops the rudimentary skills of a defensive end. ESPN analyst Tom Jackson speculates that this gorilla would be “borderline unblockable” and would likely average six sacks a game (although Jackson concedes the beast might be susceptible to counters and misdirection plays). Meanwhile, the gorilla has made it clear he would never intentionally injure any opponent.

You are commissioner of the NFL: Would you allow this gorilla to sign with the Oakland Raiders?

If faced with this decision, the commissioner’s first responsibility to is to the health and safety of his players. He probably would not allow the gorilla to sign with the Raiders — or any team — primarily for player safety reasons. A 700-pound gorilla is going to able to do a great deal of harm to players a third his size, even if we accept that there will be no intent.

However, what if the commissioner could be sure that injuries inflicted by the gorilla would be no more severe than those that will potentially be caused by any other All-Pro caliber defensive end? With this caveat, what is the commissioner’s decision?

It would depend on how he viewed the gorilla. Does the commish see him as:

(a) An example of a player who has extraordinary gifts (size, strength) that give him some huge competitive advantages, but also don’t entirely make up for his remaining weaknesses that could possibly be exploited? For example, he is likely to have trouble with play-action and counter plays. In that regard, is the gorilla not all that different from other great players who are superior to their peers but not perfect? Would he be more dominant than, say, Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, Walter Payton, Jim Brown, Shaq, Jordan, Bird, Magic, Randy Johnson, Hank Aaron, Babe Ruth, Willie Mays?

or …

(b) An example of something that violates the spirit of the game. A force so strong that it basically would give the Raiders (or whichever team) the equivalent of 12 or 13 men on the field. Does the gorilla represent an unfair competitive advantage deeply distorting the game?

If the commissioner decides (a) then he has to let him play. If he decides (b) then there’s no way he can.

Los Angeles Lakers as Super Gorilla

Where do the advantages and disadvantages created by the varying financial strength of the teams, owners, and markets fit into the conversation on competition? Money undeniably provides a competitive advantage, when exploited properly. Sometimes, even when not. So, how much influence should it be allowed to have?

In other words, does the NBA actually want or need the kind of competitive balance that a hard cap would bring?

Neither the NBA, nor any other professional sports league, is under any obligation to assure competitive balance in every single aspect of the game. The most obvious examples can be seen in the wildly varying dimensions of Major League Baseball stadiums. Playing in Fenway and playing in Citifield can be vastly different.

An illustration of where the NBA draws a line in the sand regarding how far they’ll go to provide competitive balance is with scheduling. There are many different aspects of a team’s schedule that affect its prospects, but the NBA chooses to apply a strict competitive balance formula to only three: number of games played (82), home games vs. road games (41 each), and the prohibition against playing games on more than two consecutive nights.

But the NBA does not go to extraordinary lengths to address other potential scheduling inequities, such as strength of schedule, the length of road trips, the number of back-to-back games, and the number of four-game-in-five-night stretches. Schedule makers are aware of these factors. They will try to limit their impact, but distributing them equally is not a priority. For example, for the 2010-11 season, teams were assigned between 15 and 23 back-to-backs.

The reasoning in these instances is two-fold. First, such inequities are not 100% preventable. I’m sure the disparity could be less than 15 to 23, however, it may be impossible to ensure each team plays exactly 18 back-to-backs. Second, these differentials are expected to balance out over time. While a schedule maker may not necessarily be concerned that the Bulls had 23 and the Lakers just 15 in a given season, he will probably try to prevent that from being the case the following year.

To this point, financial issues have been given treatment closer to that of back-to-backs than home vs. road schedule. Some of this is conscious, some unintentional, and some is just merely a function of need to get the approval of the NBPA to make any meaningful changes in this area. However, the idea of the finances affecting competition has been one important aspect of the discussion surrounding the NBA.

Because now, the NBA is beginning to build financial super gorillas of its own. The following two charts use Forbes data to give a picture of relative revenue in the Association.

The first shows 2010 revenue estimates.

The second shows 2005 through 2010 cumulative revenue estimates.

And this curve will become even more exaggerated when the Lakers start seeing the benefit of their new local television deal with Time Warner. Should the deal generate the rumored $150 million or more in currently unshared revenue, it will likely be — by itself — larger than the total local unshared revenue streams (TV, gate, advertising — all of it) of any other NBA team, save the Knicks. Further, it will be going to a team that Forbes estimates to have the highest gate in the league — almost 20% higher than New York, more than 40% higher than the third best gate, and approaching seven times the lowest gate in the league.

Is this simply a case of the Lakers maximizing natural advantages, or does it distort the game? Could it go beyond that? Could this kind of massive financial strength present a risk to the “health and safety” of the other teams and owners in the NBA?

Again, the question becomes: how big of a role do you wish money to play in the field of competition?

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