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CBA Talk: A Little Math

by Tim Donahue on October 6, 2011 at 11:54 am · 5 comments

Make the following assumptions regarding the current collective bargaining negotiations:

  • The informal offers reportedly proposed by each side fairly represent the basketball-related income (BRI) split that each faction would accept to approve a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) right now.
  • The players are reportedly offering a deal that gives 53% to them and 47% the owners.
  • The owners have reportedly offered a 50/50 deal.
  • No costs have been excluded from BRI that weren’t excluded under the previous CBA.
  • Both sides are assuming the same types of system changes in the new CBA.
  • The 2011-12 BRI can be expected to be $4 billion.
  • The CBA would be for six years.
  • The expected BRI growth rate over the course of the next CBA is about 4% per year.

In such a situation, the players and the owners stand $120 million apart for this upcoming season, but about $790 million over the course of the six-year deal. Discounting those cash flows at 5% would yield a net present value of $664 million — which is the $790 million in “today’s dollars.”

The Math for the Players

If the players took the owners’ 50/50 offer now, they would get $2 billion this year, which equals roughly $24.4 million per game for the players collectively. In other words, if the players reject this offer, for each game lost, the players give up $24.4 million. Following this logic, it will take missing 27 games games (something that would happen by mid-December) for the players to have lost the $664 million that they are standing firm in order to receive via the BRI split.

Of course, that logic is flawed. The situation is infinitely more complex than that.

One of the big traps that we consistently fall into is viewing the sides as two monoliths. It makes the math easier. But it also muddies the waters. The “players” are 400-plus individuals at different points in their careers with different financial positions, personal concerns and general outlooks on life.

The truth is that the majority of these players will not be in the league for all six years of the next CBA. Only 48% of the players who played during the 2005-06 season played in 2010-11. In fact, 16% of the players from the 2009-2010 season were absent in 2010-11.

While fighting for future generations is great in concept, this really is asking a huge price from the majority of the league for 3 percentage points.

The Math for the Owners

The owners will experience the same “lost income” reality that the players are facing. For the sake of argument (and simplicity), let’s assume they lost $200 million for canceling the preseason, and stand to lose another $250 million or so per month for missed regular season games if they don’t accept the players’ offer now. Just like the players, if they stick to their guns (at a 50% split) they will be have forfeited $664 million by some time around Christmas to get back the $664 million they seek.

Also, like the players’ dillemma, it is infinitely more complex.

These are 30 owners who are in different financial positions. Jerry Buss and James Dolan stand to lose huge sums, while others like Herb Kohl, Michael Jordan and perhaps Herb Simon won’t be as badly hurt. Depending on the math, it’s not impossible that they would be actually losing less money by not having games.

Beyond that, the owners should recognize the 4 percentage points that are already theoretically “in their pocket.” Accepting the players position of 53% will still give them $160 million in savings this season (when compared to the 57% split of the previous CBA), and $884 million (in today’s dollars) over the course of a new, six-year CBA. Unlike the players, virtually all of these owners will be here at the end of the CBA. So the entirely of the deal is more relevant to all 30 of the current owners than it is to all of the more than 400 current players.

This consideration means that for every 1/82 of the season they cancel, they forgo another $2 million in savings on top of their other costs.

The Math for Both Sides

Everyone realizes that, once games are canceled, there will be lasting effects well beyond the simple lost profit/wages associated with these games. Should a lockout alienate fans and sponsors, then future revenues will be lost as well.

For every 1% reduction in the revenue forecast for the next six-year period, the NBA will lose about $263 million (in today’s dollars). This loss will be distributed more or less equally between the two sides and would be in addition to the lost income discussed above.

Continuing to Fight Doesn’t Add Up

Even if the owners are adamant about a 50% split, and the players have dug in at 53%, there is no math that says it is worth it to either side to lose games. I have tried to find a financial reason for either side to stand firm until the other breaks — no matter how long it takes — but I can’t. Not even if I take off my shoes.

Come Monday, if games are canceled, neither side can win. It will only be a question of which side has lost less.

But, as I’ve said before, even rational people will kill for money, but die for faith.

Right now, they say they disagree on “the economics,” but they don’t. They can’t — not if they vaguely understand “the economics.” No, what’s happening here is an Uncle Milty contest masquerading as a disagreement over BRI splits.

Well, boys, it’s come-to-Jesus time.

It’s time to put away the egos and take out the calculators. It’s time to take David Stern’s pointer finger, Dwyane Wade’s audacity, Dan Gilbert’s comic sans, Kevin Garnett’s scowl, the hard cap, the second mid-level exception, the roll backs, and stick them all in Mrs. Sarver’s purse. And then bury it all deep in an abandoned mine shaft.

It’s time for Stern to wrangle up the cats, and it’s time for player union heads Derek Fisher and Billy Hunter to bring in the rank and file. It’s time for each to end the rhetoric and the spin, and tell their constituencies straight up that not taking one more step towards each other is simply a lose/lose proposition.

It’s time for everyone to learn and understand what “Pyrrhic victory” means.

Acknowledgment: Once again, thanks to Larry Coon and his group of super geniuses over at LakersGround.net for helping to shape my thoughts here.

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After weeks, months and, arguably, years of preparing for the likelihood of a long, frigid winter for the NBA and its players, did last week bring a sudden and unexpected thaw? Consider what Sam Amick referred to yesterday as “the reading of the labor tea leaves.”

On the heels of Roger Mason’s now-infamous tweet in which the NBPA vice president wrote, “Looking like a season. How u,” but later claimed his account was hacked, one league source claims that union president Derek Fisher text-messaged numerous players last week indicating that some progress had been made and imploring them to be physically prepared just in case the season started on time. There was another curious happening on Thursday, when — according to ESPN’s Chris Broussard — NBA deputy commissioner Adam Silver attended the U.S. Open with Wasserman Media Group CEO, Casey Wasserman [whose company employs NBA power agent Arn Tellum and serves his stable of clients, which includes Pau Gasol, Joe Johnson, Brandon Roy, Al Horford, Russell Westbrook, Tyreke Evans, LaMarcus Aldridge and Danilo Galinari].

With much of the NBA blogosphere begging for activity daily since June 30th, they should be pleased with both last week and this week.  Last week brought the optimism so many were seeking. An owner/player meeting today includes an expanded group of representatives for each side. On Thursday, the two sides will break into their individual conclaves to let their constituents know the current state of the negotiations. (The owners will meet in Dallas and the Derek Fisher will take the NBPA reps to Vegas, where about 40 players are slated to participate in the Impact Basketball Academy summer league.)

Of course, we could just be in for a much-needed lesson in the difference between activity and accomplishment, as Ken Berger cautions.

According to five people briefed on the three days of high-level talks over the past two weeks, the two sides essentially are in the same place they’ve been since the owners’ most recent formal proposal in late June: billions of dollars apart.

“I don’t think they’ve made any progress there at all,” one of the people briefed on the negotiations told CBSSports.com. “They’re talking a lot, and the conversations are more cordial. But as far as the real numbers, I don’t think there’s anything there.”

So what we hear on a daily basis could mean everything, nothing or anything in between. One month from now, we could be analyzing free agent moves and training camps or we could be sitting exactly where we are. As has been the case for two and a half months, nothing will be any different, until something is actually different.

Hawks, Doves and Henry’s Owner Headcount

On Friday, TrueHoop’s Henry Abbott posted one of the most useful pieces of the lockout thus far — his “best assessment of where the 30 owners stand at the moment” in terms of their bargaining positions. And his research has led him to conclude that the ownership group is more fragmented than David Stern would have you believe.

The way the NBA tells it, all 30 owners are perfectly united, on every issue from hard caps to revenue sharing.

Of course, it cannot be so. Human nature dictates some owners are doves — eager to play the upcoming season — while others are hawks who would risk ditching a season in the name of a new collective bargaining agreement that strongly favors owners.

If the harbingers of progress are real (denials, notwithstanding), and the two sides are on the verge of an agreement that prevents the cancellation of games, then it tells me that the owners have moved considerably from their most recent public position. The reasons why the owners — who have been broadly portrayed as unreasonable bullies in this conflict — may actually be dealing from a semi-permanent position of weakness can be seen by using Abbott’s research to break things down a little further.

Though Abbott’s piece is based upon some speculation, it is relatively well-founded speculation. He lists “more than a dozen well-placed sources” that include “people directly involved in the talks, owners, players, CBA experts.” So for the purposes of this discussion, let’s presume it is at least accurate enough to base a worthwhile conversation on.

The simple tally is as follows:

17 “Hawks” (who would risk the season in the name of a new CBA that strongly favors owners)
12 “Doves” (who are eager to play the upcoming season)
1 Unclear (Alex Meruelo, who owns the team in Atlanta I won’t name for the confusion it could create)

Even if you were to cede Meruelo to the side of the hawks, 18 to 12 does not represent a strong majority. This count would dovetail with a comment Abbott made a few weeks suggesting that only about four owners needed to be moved out of the hawk category to get a deal signed with the players. Therefore, let’s take his arguments and break the owners down even further.

(Bucks owner and hawk hardliner Sen. Herb Kohl (D-WI) on what he thinks of the current CBA.)

Hawk Hardliners – 7

Jordan (CHA), Gilbert (CLE), Kroenke (DEN), Heisley (MEM), Kohl (MIL), Sarver (PHO), Maloofs (SAC)

These guys want big changes in the CBA and robust revenue sharing. But they are not a particularly influential group and are further muted by the possibility that they may not agree to any compromise that the players could swallow.

“Hockey” Hawk Hardliners – 2

Tannenbaum (TOR), Leonsis (WAS)

These guys also own NHL team. They lived through that league’s canceled 2005 season and came out OK. But they may be drawing parallels that are or aren’t sound. The answer to that isn’t something we could know unless an NBA season, in 2011-12, gets cancelled.

Private Equity Hawks – 2

Gores (DET), Harris (PHI)

These two come from the private equity world and are brand-new owners who are probably looking at the bottom line more closely than previous owners.

Hawks Who Had Success But Want Better Returns – 6

Grousbeck (BOS), Cuban (DAL), Allen (POR), Taylor (MIN), Holt (SAS), Miller (UTA)

Cuban and Holt probably fit the bill best for “smart owners who know how to succeed in current system, but recognize it includes huge amounts of luck if you’re not the Lakers.” If there is common fear among these guys, it’s that if they fall, they might not be able to get back up again. (See: Glen Taylor). But it’s not the individual motivations that matter here as much as who these guys represent. This group includes some of the most successful and stable franchises in the league.

(Jerry Buss enjoying some “psychic benefits” of owning the Lakers.)

Doves in Huge Markets Who Are Doing Just Fine Under the Current CBA – 3

Buss (LAL), Reinsdorf (CHI), Dolan (NYK)

It seems to me that there is really no way these three franchises don’t come out of this worse in any “reset” of the system. The current structure gives them big advantages that they are financially capable of exploiting. Perhaps Chicago might see some advantages compared with the other two (Jerry Reinsdorf is a much more conservative spender than the other two), but really, all three would probably be better off continuing the old CBA.

Doves in Strong Markets And/Or With A Large Incentive to Play This Year – 5

Lacob/Gruber (GSW), Bennett (OKC), DeVos (ORL), Arison (MIA), Alexander (HOU)

These guys range from “I’m OK with the current system” to “we gotta play this year.” Bennett and DeVos may benefit long term from changes to the system, but they won’t vote to lose this season. (Durant/Westbrook have too much short-term potential and Dwight Howard may only have so much time left in Orlando.) Arison needs the season (LeBron/Wade/Bosh won’t be around forever), and Golden State and Houston are doing well enough in their larger markets to be OK with how things currently stand.

Dove Living the American Dream – 1

Prokhorov (NJN)

Mikhail is immensely wealthy and owns arguably the league’s worst-performing franchise. But he will soon be moving to a huge market in Brooklyn and is trying to hang onto a superstar (or near-superstar) in Deron Williams, as Abbott noted. The history of the franchise suggests that its owner would take a hard line, but hope for future and the kind of money tailor-made to exploit the old system keeps him dovish.

Dove Named Donald Sterling – 1

Sterling (LAC)

I can’t begin to really explain the machinations here, but the short answer is that Donald Sterling will figure out how to make whatever system exists work to his advantage — financially.  Besides, it’s certain he doesn’t want to lose another season of Blake Griffin.

League-Owned Dove – 1

NBA (NOH)

As Abbott puts it: “As the NBA owns the team, the good money is that this vote will echo whatever Stern wants. And by the time Stern presents a deal to owners for their votes, it’s a sure thing he’ll want it to pass.” In short, the league won’t put up any fight against its own proposal.

The One Dove Pacers Fans Care About Most – 1

Simon (IND)

Simon wants big revenue sharing changes, but he is apparently malleable on the system. At 76-years-old, Herb Simon is reasonably eager to move forward with the Pacers’ turnaround. Given the positive vibes emanating from last years’ finish and the ample cap space available, Simon may just be tired of waiting to finally erase the JailPacer era.

Go Big or Stay Home

Possibly the single most important thing to understand about the negotiation relationship between the owners and the players is also the one that has been singularly (perhaps studiously) ignored.

It is as follows: A lockout is the only weapon in the owners’ arsenal, if they want to make significant changes.

Without that threat, and without the will to act on that threat, the owners are reduced to saying, “pretty please with sugar on it” for anything they want. The NBPA need only play a spoiling action to put the owners to a decision about losing games, and most times, that will be a relatively safe gamble.

The issue faced in this bargaining session is that the owners view the current agreement as to be almost entirely in favor of the players.  As such, there is nothing they have that they would be willing to “trade.” Since they have no carrot, they are left with only the stick.

But the lockout, and  more importantly, the actual cancellation of games — let alone a season — must be used prudently. Before crossing that line, the owners must be rock solid sure of two things: (1) they will stick together, and (2) they will win.

As we see by the diversity of the list above, sticking together is a problem. Though many owners would like to see significant changes, this new look provided by Abbott’s breakdown — and my further distinctions — makes it hard to see that many would be willing to sacrifice much more than the summer and/or preseason to get them.

Of the 17 hawks listed in the Abbott piece, only seven seem to be entrenched enough to be willing to sacrifice all or even part of a season. And those on the extremes of a vote are always somewhat irrelevant in a negotiation, as little or nothing that transpires will change their minds. These seven (the owners of Charlotte, Cleveland, Denver, Memphis, Milwaukee, Phoenix and Sacramento) are further marginalized by the fact that they hold little influence within the voting community.

Moving to the other end of the hawk spectrum, you have the six owners who are most likely to swing their vote. Their positions seem “soft” to me — at least in this limited context. Dallas’ Cuban and Boston’s Grousbeck seem more likely to want to be hard on the players to avoid any significant revenue sharing reforms. But both, along with San Antonio’s Holt, are going to be highly motivated to get their aging championship contenders back onto the floor as quickly as possible. As rich as Cuban is, he may be swayed to kick the can (meaning any problems he has with the current CBA) down the road six years so he can get a 33-year-old Dirk and the rest of his old squad back on the court in November to mount a title defense.

If the owners are unsure that they will be able to remain unified then they’re probably even less sure of being able to “win.” That is to say that even the cancellation of a full season is unlikely to bring the owners what they want. And it seems that the previous two years of saber-rattling from the owners has put the players in position to last out a year.

Consider this: While some owners are fine with (and some would may actually prefer) a system like the current one, there are zero players who want anything to do with the owners’ proposed changes. So while the owners have largely been portrayed (and specifically, by me) as the more unified group who have the bank accounts to hold out longer, that might be a false narrative. One side features about 18 guys who want a CBA “reset”; the other features 450 guys (plus a ton of high-powered agents and any sponsors that just wants the games to start on time) that want the status quo. Unity comes easy, when all you’re trying to do is get somebody to vote “no” to what they view as “a poke in the eye with a sharp stick.”

Furthermore, the changes the owners want will disproportionally affect the middle and lower rung players, who basically are the union. The question of the lost paychecks can be ameliorated by understanding the structure of the players’ pay. According to Shamsports, 272 players made $3 million or less last season (combined, this group made about $314 million). If I were planning for the union, I would be using the reported $175 million lockout war chest, along with possibly the $26 million filler from the BRI audit to support that block of players through the lockout.

Those players, plus a chunk of the 124 players who made between $5-$15 million last year who are staring at being gutted, would likely give you a rock solid “no” vote to anything resembling the owners last public proposal.

Add to that potential (though limited) overseas opportunities, and it’s realistic to believe that the players could last an entire season or more. While I’ve made the comparison of “guys who’ve learned to hold their breath longer vs. guys with oxygen tanks” in the past, I’m less sure that there isn’t a tipping point in a long lockout where the advantage swings back to the players. None of this even considers what impact an upcoming National Labor Relations Board ruling could have, let alone the fallout from a potential decertification of the NBPA or any other litigation.

What it really comes down to is the inherent problem of having just this one weapon in the arsenal. If the threat doesn’t work, you have to cancel games. If canceling games doesn’t work, you have to cancel the season.  If canceling the season doesn’t work, that’s the ballgame.

Now and pretty much forever.

Winning without Winning, Losing without Losing

So now the owners are in the grey area where everything can still be walked back. Other than some meaningless summer leagues, nothing has been cancelled, so nothing has been done that can’t be “undone.” If they are going to abandon their hard line so that no scheduled games will be missed then they have to act now.

Given the seemingly fragmented position of ownership shown here, it’s a very real possibility that they could easily abandon their hopes for a “reset” of the system, and settle for a simple money grab that could be gained through a more favorable BRI revenue split. It could be that the “reset” was always a red herring, and this could have been the goal of certain key owners all along.

But then again, maybe the owners are considerably less smart than that and were “fighting the last war.” Maybe after spending the last two months (and/or years) trying to convince the players they were serious, they finally realized the players were serious, too. Then, they contemplated what they were going to have to do if they really were serious. And upon reflection, and perhaps number-crunching, they are not prepared to do it.

In either case, the last two months could have served to push both sides off balance enough that an offer to maintain most or all of the current CBA system (soft cap, Bird exceptions, MLE, guaranteed deals, and contract lengths) could gain the owners a better BRI split — and faster — than otherwise hoped. It seems likely that getting the players down to 50/50, give or take a percentage point, would be enough for all but the seven hardliners above to agree to start the season on time (or as close to it as possible) regardless of the cap system.

Assuming the players are willing to go as far as 50/50 is a risky proposition. But it’s not unreasonable. It’s important to remember that the players — like the owners — are not of a hive mind.  And while the BRI split is important to both, the actual percentage is really something of an abstraction to the two sides.

Consider this: Reducing the BRI split to 50/50 would represent a “pay cut” for the players of a little over 12%. How that affects each player, however, remains an open question. Assuming the same cap structure, you would clearly be able to see the impact on max deals, rookie deals and full MLEs. However, what happens with everyone in between?

Let’s pretend for a moment that, under the old CBA, Nene would have signed a 5-year deal averaging $12 million this summer. Now, under a CBA that is unchanged structurally but features a 50/50 BRI split, it is not certain that he would suffer from a 12% pay cut and instead have an average annual salary of $10.5 million. What he will demand on the open market could be unchanged.

This is because non-max, non-rookie and non-MLE contracts are only tangentially a function of the BRI split.

The primary determinant would be the same as always has been: the number of suitors with available cap space, and the ardor with which they will pursue him. The NBA’s salary structure doesn’t even approach being sophisticated or calibrated enough to have any direct effect on that market reality.

Now let’s talk about the impact a system change might have.

Let’s keep the BRI split at 57%, but reduce the max contract length to four or five years, instead of the current five or six years. That saves the owners zero dollars in total and pays the players the same amount. However, it is likely to have a far more obvious and punitive effect on individual players.

By reducing the max length by even one year, you impose a 20.1% reduction on what would have previously been a six-year deal, and a 23.5% reduction on what would have previously been a five-year deal. Of course, the player would have the opportunity to make that sum up on the next contract. But you have to ask yourself — what percentage of NBA actually players sign more than one “big” contract? (Answer: usually only the few that were worth their first big one.)

Unlike the exercise we went through with the owners, we can’t attempt any useful break down of how the league’s 450 players may be inclined to vote. There are just too many individuals with two many unknowable motivations and thought processes. But we can reasonably put ourselves in the mind of Josh McRoberts, the player ranked 250th out of 500 in ESPN’s #NBARank project. If you are him, which is more threatening to you: a reduction in the total amount of money the players will be owed or the reduction in the length of contracts and a hard (or harder) cap that will necessarily curtail guaranteed contracts?

I think we know which Josh would choose.

We will likely hear later today if more owners now seem inclined to let Josh keep his years — and the rest of the player-favorable system — in exchange for a cash grab off the top.

Ira Winderman summed it up perfectly.

We have reached the point of the NBA lockout where things either will move quickly or not at all.

If the owners let go of the system, and the players see significant value in that, then there is probably enough common ground — and common fear — to get a deal done.

If not

Acknowledgment: Recently, I have had the privilege of receiving access to a team of financial and legal experts formed by Larry Coon. Their purpose was to parse through the league’s financial documents and make sense of the financial issues that underlie the labor dispute. They contributed greatly to Larry’s previous article on the lockout and have provided the foundation for some of the ideas in this piece. Assume the good ones are theirs, the bad ones are mine. Many thanks to Larry Coon for the opportunity and to everyone involved – all denizens of LakersGround.net — for their time and thoughts.

As always, thanks to Jared Wade for his help on editing and generally helping shape the piece into something coherent.

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“All things are subject to interpretation. Whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.” – Friedrich Nietzche

Sam Amick conducted a Q&A Sports with National Basketball Players Association vice president Maurice Evans for Sports Illustrated. It is a well-articulated position of how Evans sees the current labor impasse between the owners and the players. Evans believes every word he says there, and it comes through.

So it doesn’t matter so much that every word he says is wholly self-serving and every bit as misleading as the words he criticizes NBA Commissioner David Stern for saying on a recent “BS Report” podcast with Bill Simmons. Evans will not be called out for what he said. It’s unimportant that his interview serves the exact same purpose with the exact same motives — to make his case — that Stern’s appearance did. Why? Because he actually believes the mislead, and he’s speaking to an audience that (mostly) has accepted the mislead.

Even if he is caught in some factual misstep, it will be dismissed as a technicality. He was, after all, being honest in his statements. When he said them, he considered them to be true. He can’t be expected to fully understand and articulate all of that financial mumbo jumbo. He’s a real person speaking real stuff, not some accountant.

The problem with nuanced situations is, the more you understand them, the less firm and more oddly specific you become in your statements. And that combination of being fuzzy, yet oddly specific undermines the credibility you have with a broader audience. We live in a world that has come to equate simplicity with truth and complexity with obfuscation.

It’s why the players have such a huge advantage from a public relations perspective over the owners, and it’s also indicative that the players are much stronger in relation to the owners than is generally believed. Evans may be subject to being considered wrong, but he cannot be accused of lying. It’s even questionable, I guess, as to how guilty he is of “misleading” people, since he’s been somewhat misled himself.

David Stern, on the other hand, is always assumed to know something more than he’s saying. Nothing he ever says or does is taken at face value. Of course, Stern is at least partially responsible for this perception. He has cultivated an image of being a shrewd, sharp operator. He has pissed off the fan base of virtually every NBA team at one time or another.

Some respect David Stern. Many fear David Stern.

Nobody trusts David Stern.

In the third clip of a recent episode of HoopSpeak Live (an online, NBA discussion show produced by the TrueHoop Network blog HoopSpeak), co-hosts Beckley Mason and, mostly, Ethan Sherwood Strauss sort of go after co-host Zach Harper for apparently defending Stern’s performance on Simmons’ podcast. Beckley opens it by asking “What did you think of Stern’s game plan … of coming off so exasperated and as a victim?”

That “exasperation” that came through in the podcast was probably the most honest expression of how Stern feels that we have heard publicly. He misdirects some on the financial issue of depreciation and parses his words on the owners offer when he talks about the 8% pay cut, but he is making his case. But because we hold Stern to a different standard, and because Stern is saying things we don’t want to hear, all of his points are largely either diminished or ignored entirely by most of those interested in how this impasse will be solved.

Truthiness

Stern characterizing the owners’ latest offer as an “8% [pay] cut … [to] $2 Billion, then hold them there while we try to grow out of the where we find ourselves” is no more misleading and no less accurate than, say, the following statement from Evans.

The major, if not the most, misleading thing was him saying that if Billy [Hunter, NBPA executive director] just tells the players that all I’m asking for is eight percent salary cuts that there would be resolution. That eight percent is actually 40 percent over 10 years, and the actual total is $7.6 billion that he’s asking for. Even if you’re saying, ‘We already make $2.17 billion [annually] in salaries.’ That hasn’t grown. That’s why we got our entire escrow back and then some.

Unsurprisingly, Evans’ statement of position is being taken at face value, while Stern’s has been described as “truthiness.” In all actuality, the opposite is the case.

If “truthiness” is defined as “truth that comes from the gut, not books” or, even more appropriately, “the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather than concepts or facts known to be true,” then Mo’s statement is chock full of truthiness. Meanwhile, Stern’s is almost entirely composed of fact (tinged with smarm) — accurately (though narrowly) representing the action the owners want to take based on the current actual payroll.

The numbers used by Evans and the NBPA are based on a reality that doesn’t exist, but are presented earnestly and with righteous indignation. They’re based on rolling the current system, or something very much like it, forward for the next decade. However, that system and that reality ended — died — at midnight on June 30. These two sides are negotiating fighting over what the new system and the new reality will be.

Evans and the players frame the $7.6 billion as money that is already theirs that the owners are trying to take from them. Strictly speaking, the $7.6 billion is actually the difference between what the owners want to pay the players and what the players want to be paid. Neither is “real.” They are simply stakes set in the ground by the two sides.

Evans’ statement is a regurgitation of talking points, playing on a broadly accepted narrative that is mostly incorrect. Stern’s statement is spin based on narrowly defined facts that don’t hide anything, per se, but that require the listener have a certain level of understanding to grasp the total impact. Both are “untrue,” yet one is accepted and the other rejected.

Lie to Me

This is why I am skeptical when I read the conclusion from Tom Ziller of SBnation’s reaction.

I don’t understand why Stern feels the need to mislead the fans. Again, there’s no PR war to win. There are PR ramifications, but all Stern can do is hurt the future of his league by reinforcing the nasty stereotype that American pro athletes, and NBA players in particular, are greedy bums. What does Stern get out of lying to fans, other than perhaps some nods of approval from the Rick Reillys of the world? If you aren’t going to let us have basketball, at least give us the truth. We can handle it.

The fans don’t want anything to do with “the truth.” The fans want games. That’s it. They’ll treat things that support that goal as their truth, and they’ll reject anything to the contrary as lies. That’s as far as that goes. It’s a perfectly sensible stance to take. The truth isn’t going to help them get what they want, and quite frankly, “Stop running your mouths and get back to me when you get your acts together” is probably the appropriate message for the fans to send both sides.

“The truth” is a messy thing. (And I’m not just talking about Paul Pierce’s facial hair.) It sounds great in theory, but in practice, it’s really more of a “be careful what you wish for” type of thing. Transparency is another thing that people like a lot more when they are demanding it than when they actually have it. “Transparency” conjures a Wilsonian open-covenants-arrived-at-openly kind of vibe that makes everybody feel puffy and, you know, ethical. In fact, transparency is more akin to watching someone go to the bathroom — it’s an uncomfortable experience for all involved.

Actually, the relative transparency of the current CBA process is why most NBA onlookers are miserable right now. We have all been forced (or, more accurately, have volunteered our attention) to watch the “sausage-making” of the NBA. It is a process we have no control over, so it fills us with the most luscious of emotions — impotent rage.

But, hey. Here we sit, and we’re not going anywhere any time soon.  So let’s consider this.

Make It About Something Else – Anything Else

First, if the truth is what we want, then it raises the bar for everybody. We can’t just chastise Stern and then accept Evans when he says that “the last [players'] offer was [a giveback of] $630 million over a six-year period. That’s over a $100 million a year and they told us that it was pathetic” without bothering to understand why the owners may have been underwhelmed by such generosity.

Because, to the owners, a “concession” of $100 million per year is pathetic. Assuming they have reached the same conclusions that I reached here — and it’s an absolute certainty they have — $100 million represents only a fraction of the amount of money they think goes to waste annually in players’ salaries.  It does nothing to accomplish the “reset” Stern has said the owners feel they need to re-gain league-wide profitability. Especially when it’s tied to largely the same salary cap visor system that the owners are committed to changing.

If we’re demanding the truth, perhaps we should give some notice to the  NBPA’s entire strategy: deflect and distract. They must get people to ignore the fact that core purpose of the Collective Bargaining Agreement is to determine how much and in what manner the players get paid. Move the conversation away from any in-depth analysis of that — particularly regarding the paychecks given to the league’s also-rans who add little or nothing in terms of wins or revenue. That’s a total loser for the players, so their leadership has created the following marching orders.

Point to the fixed percentage of BRI and claim that as proof that the problem lies elsewhere. Hammer away about revenue sharing. Use the phrase “they should clean up their house first,” all the while ignoring the fact that it is their house. All of it. Their house.

Talk about what you are “giving back,” but never discuss that you’re really taking out. It’s the owners’ money, a fact actually reinforced by this silly insistence that it be treated like a hobby. Cast doubt on the financials that your own accountants audited and signed off on by rejecting certain line items, then allow the narrative to drift from “we don’t think interest and depreciation should be included” to “the owners are lying about their financials” and give it your tacit approval.

Cite the example of Golden State being sold for $450 million in 2010, complain how you didn’t share in that, thus proving interest on debt incurred in purchases is “not your problem.” Fail to mention that your players were paid almost $800 million in salaries and benefits during the time Chris Cohan owned the Warriors. Claim that “you helped build the franchise,” but don’t show this list of players or talk about the fact that those players lost 62% of their games and only made one playoff appearance.

And for God’s sake — this is the most important thing to remember — talk about David Stern’s salary. It is a sum that is obviously completely irrelevant to this entire conversation, but bring it up again and again. But be sure not to note that, even at the likely wildly overstated $23 million some have claimed, Stern still made less than half of what T-Mac and JO combined to make in 2010. (Of course, Tracy and Jermaine’s salaries, individually, are also complete irrelevancies, but, hey, you started it.)

Don’t forget to claim guaranteed deals as a birthright. But be sure not to get into any discussion as to why you should get such security. You can’t acknowledge the reality that every player — on some level — views each contract he signs at least as much a reward for getting to that point as compensation for future play. Better to claim, according to Evans, it’s what the league’s founding fathers would want.

The Bill Russells, Michael Jordans, Larry Birds and Magic Johnsons have done great things to allow us to make the salaries we have and wear these great uniforms. It’d be a shame to give up everything those guys have fought for.

Talk down to the public about the struggles that Michael Jordan faced while becoming perhaps the most famous person in the history of the world. Try to make us think of Bill Russell instead of Eddy Curry or Jamaal Tinsley. Evoke the memory of Elgin Baylor’s and Jerry West’s refusal to play in the 1964 NBA All-Star Game to make this feel like it’s about true labor benefits like pensions, better workplace conditions and the right to not play in so many unpaid exhibition tours — not about keeping the dream of that one big contract alive for most of their rank and file.

Lastly, emphasize the absolute worst case (and incredibly unlikely) scenario of what a hard cap will inevitably create without really being certain about the future. Consider this anecdote from another excellent Sam Amick piece:

As described by one such agent who was briefed about the owners’ proposal and what it could mean, a player such as Lakers forward Lamar Odom would see his salary plummet from $8.9 million to $2.6 million next season in one particular doomsday scenario, according to the union officials putting on the presentation.

A more measured and accurate response appears within a great piece from Zach Lowe of SI’s The Point Forward. Zach reached out to a few labor lawyers, agents, attorneys and economists for some expert opinions on how the institution of a hard cap would effect the payroll structure going forward.

And here’s what Jeffrey Kessler, lead outside counsel to the players’ union and a partner at the law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf, had to say.

“If you have an individual team hard cap, you are going to be desperate to maintain flexibility and to remove and replace players. And that means all but the stars would likely lose their guaranteed contracts. If you have a hard cap for every team, and you’re going to pay the stars of the game fairly, there isn’t going to be enough money left over for the other players. Every NBA player understands this. Big time.”

Now, I think Mr. Kessler is pretty close to the mark here, particularly in regards to limiting guaranteed contracts.  However, the definition of “enough money” depends on who you’re talking to. I mean, doesn’t that pay structure align more closely to the way the NBA actually works?  Further, if the NBPA leadership is using the Lamar Odom scenario to make sure every NBA player understands this “big time,” then they’re basically employing scare tactics on their own people.

But what they see can be illustrated by the example Zach Lowe created later in the same post:

It’s easy to say the players will earn what they earn, whether the cap is soft or hard, as long as total player salaries are tied to the league’s overall revenue. That hard cap scenario might be scary for those run-of-the-mill veterans, though. Imagine each team has a hard cap of $50 million, and they reserve $30 million of that for two superstars. That leaves $20 million for at least 11 players. Suddenly there are fewer guys with listed salaries in the $4 million-$6 million range and many more earning $1 million to $2 million. Even in a system in which players might end up earning more than their listed salary, it’s not hard to imagine them taking a big overall hit if the end-of-year pay bump they get is based upon a salary floor that is suddenly much lower.

Lowe is clearly and fairly representing a concern here that exists in many players’ minds, but I’m not entirely sure that the fear isn’t overblown.  First — and it’s a minor quibble —  the $50 million number is a bit light given the current proposal would put it closer to the mid-$60 million range. Second, there aren’t 60 superstars. Finally, it may be a bit of a stretch to assume that the market would behave purely that way.

I reached out to J.A. Sherman of the Thunder blog Welcome to Loud City on this final matter, and he expressed his skepticism. “The one thing I don’t buy is the idea that if there’s a $50 million hard cap, the two best players would end up taking around 60% of the space,” wrote Sherman in an email. “I don’t think you can assume a priori that if a price ceiling were to be placed below the supply/demand intersection that it would not also cause downward pressure on the top salaries as well. It may in some cases — we see that already with Miami — but I would think that the trend over time would reduce the disproportionate scaling.”

Put another way, as the league adapts to the new rules, the salary structure by player will start to look more and more like it does today, minus the guarantees and pro-rated downward based on a lower cap.

But, that type of uncertainty about what may happen is of no value in this context. For Billy Hunter and Jeffrey Kessler, its simply more expedient to tell horror stories of Lamar Odom — a quality player on a championship team — getting a 70% haircut,  and leave it at that. Particularly when you consider in a union/league with a membership of 450 or more players, the CBA will be decided by the bottom two-thirds of that group.

Evans says:

They’re unified, and as unified [as the players], and that’s great for them. It’s not about who’s more unified and having a battle of wills. It’s about knowing what’s right.

Of course, he’s completely wrong here. It is a battle of wills. Always has been, always will be. There is no “right.” There’s just what is agreed upon.

Even so, Maurice Evans believes he is “By God Right,” as do his compatriots.  Meanwhile, Stern and the largely silent owners hold the same measure of faith that they are “By God Right.”  What both should know, and are about to demonstrate, is that justice tends to favor the hand that is swifter with the sword.

Ultimately, demanding honesty from either side is something of a fool’s errand. It will be forthcoming from neither.  Each will continue to stick to their talking points, zealously and earnestly making their case. Truth is of no real benefit to either. Not when lies are just as often created in the ear as the mouth.

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A lot of good stuff from a Q&A between Indy Star beat writer Mike Wells and Danny Granger. The Pacers captain generally is frustrated by all the uncertainty surrounding next season but has been staying in shape playing with guys like Paul George, Blake Griffin and Trevor Ariza.

He also plans to coordinate some team workouts along with Jeff Foster well before the season starts in hopes that, even though training camp and preseason are likely already lost, the squad can have some time together to gel before the actual season, hopefully, begins.

It’s short so go read the whole thing. But here are a few of  his comments that I found the most interesting.

“I’m working out with no end in sight right now. Usually I’m ramping up to go full speed. With no set date on training camp starting, everybody is doing their own thing.”

“There’s not going to be a preseason, probably won’t be much of a training camp, either.”

“Nobody knows how much [David Stern] makes, though. That’s the craziest thing I’ve heard.”

“Everybody hates what happened in Miami, but it brought a lot of attention to the league.”

“There are some good power forwards out there. I think we need to be deeper at that position”

Not a lot of good news.

Nice shots thrown at the Heat though.

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